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Abstract
This paper estimates a Frequent Flyer Programs (FFP) price premium—higher
fares associated with a larger proportion of travelers using FFP. The results show that
FFP affect the entire price distribution, but the effect is larger on lower end fares. In
addition, airport dominance increases the premium on less expensive fares but has no
effect on the premium associated with the right tail of the price distribution.
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1 Introduction
Frequent Flyer Programs (FFP) have grown significantly since the introduction of AAdvan-
tage in 1981, the deregulation of the industry and the introduction of computer reservation
systems. It is calculated that FFP have more that 80 million participants. The largest
FFP in the U.S. are AAdvantage from American Airlines, Mileage Plus from United, and
Sky Miles from Delta, each having more than 20 million members.1 On the other hand,
deregulation also replaced the traditional point-to-point service with the hub-and-spoke
system raising the importance of hubs and airport dominance on pricing.
Existing empirical evidence, e.g. Borenstein (1989), shows how airport dominance influ-
ences the carriers ability to charge higher prices. In a related paper, Lederman (2008) uses
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the formation of partnerships to estimate that at least 25% of the ‘hub premium’—higher
fares charged by hub airlines for flights originating at its hub—can be accounted by FFP.
Other papers on FFP include Lederman (2007) who looks at the effect of international
partnerships on domestic demand and Bilotkach (2009) who looks at partnerships and fre-
quency. Despite the importance of FFP, research in this area is scarce mainly because
information on individual miles balances are not available to researchers. This paper uses
a novel way to measure the extent of FFP to overcome this obstacle.
The current paper extends existing literature in three aspects. First, it provides an esti-
mate of the FFP premium—higher fares associated with FFP. Second, it assesses the effect
of FFP on the distribution of fares, and third, it evaluates the role of airport dominance
on the effect of FFP on different percentiles of fares. The results show that a one percent
increase in the proportion of travelers that use frequent flyer programs increases average
fares by 1.16%. The effect is larger on the lower end of the price distribution than on more
expensive tickets. Moreover, the effect of FFP on lower end fares was found to be greater
when the carrier has a dominant position in the departing airport.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of
the data, Section 3 presents the empirical model and Section 4 provides the results. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data set for this paper comes from the market and the ticket sub-sections of the
DB1B database and the segment sub-section of the T-100 database from the Bureau of
Transportation and Statistics (BTS). The DB1B is a 10% random sample quarterly data of
airline passenger ticket transactions with information on the ticket price, origin, destination
and any connecting airports, carrier, type of ticket and service class. The T-100 has
information on number of performed departures as well as number of seats and transported
passengers between an origin and destination airport pair.
The paper focuses on domestic, round-trip, coach class tickets between the first quarter
of 2000 and the third quarter of 2009. We restrict the analysis to round-trip tickets because
these tickets allow us to identify the originating airport of the ticket. To restrict the analysis
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to economically significant routes, the sample includes only routes that had at least one
carrier transporting an average of 40 passengers per week, by either direct or connecting
service. The construction of the data set is such that each observation in the sample
corresponds to a route—a pair of origin and destination airports—served by a carrier on
a quarter. The carriers considered are AirTran, Alaska, American, Continental, Delta,
Frontier, JetBlue, Northwest, Spirit, Trans World Airlines, United, and US Airways, each
with its corresponding FFP partners. Because frequent flyer miles can also be obtained
by traveling with a carrier’s FFP partner, we identified the partners of each of the main
carriers and considered those tickets as belonging to the main carrier. e.g. American Eagle
miles count towards American Airlines’ frequent flyer program.
3 Empirical Model
To investigate the relationship between pricing and the extent of frequent flyer programs,
we estimate the following reduced-form pricing equation:
logMeanfareijt = δ · Ffpijt +X ′ijtβ + νt + εij + µijt (1)
where each observation refers to route i, carrier j during quarter t. The dependent variable
log Meanfare is the logarithm of the average of fares. To further analyze the effect of
loyalty programs on the tails of the price distribution we will also use the log 20th and the
log 80th percentiles of fares as dependent variables, log 20Pctfare and log 80Pctfare,
respectively. The main variable of interest is Ffp, a measure of FFP. It is obtained as the
ratio of frequent flyer tickets to the total number of tickets, where the number of frequent
flyer tickets is the number of tickets with a price equal to zero as recorded in the DB1B
database.2 The vector of controls X ′ijt includes time-variant carrier-route characteristics
not captured by the fixed effects. It includes Propdepaijt, a measure of airport dominance
that is constructed as the proportion of departures out of the departing airport in route j
that belong to carrier i during time t. Constructed in the same fashion, Propdestijt is the
proportion of nonstop destinations of carrier i out of the departing airport in route j and
2The typical approach in empirical studies that use the DB1B database is to control for tickets sold
through frequent flyer programs by eliminating tickets prices below $10 or $20. See, for example, Borenstein
and Rose (1994) or more recently Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
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Propdirectijt is the proportion of direct flights. Also in X
′
ijt, Numdestijt is the total
number of destination of carrier i out of the departing airport on route j and Loadfactijt
is the load factor or capacity utilization. Finally, νt denotes the unobservable time specific
effect, εij captures any unobservable carrier-route time-invariant specific effect and µijt is
the remaining disturbance. The fixed effects control, for example, for changes over time in
industry-level prices and for time-invariant hub effects on pricing.
A positive δ coefficient will be evidence of a positive FFP premium. To analyze the
role of airport dominance on the FFP premium we present two additional specifications.
The first includes the interaction term Ffpijt × Propdepaijt in Equation 1 to see how the
premium changes as a carrier increases its presence at the departing airport. The second
approach separates the effect of Fftijt on fares in two, when the proportion of departures
is below its median and when it is above its median:
logMeanfareijt = δ1 · Ffpijt × 1[Propdepa > med(Propdepa)] (2)
+ δ2 · Ffpijt × 1[Propdepa ≤ med(Propdepa)] +X ′ijtβ + νt + εij + µijt.
The indicator variable 1[Propdepa > med(Propdepa)] is equal to one when Propdepaijt is above
its median, zero otherwise. The estimation of Equations 1 and 2 will additionally consider
various log percentiles of fares as dependent variables.
4 Estimation Results
The summary statistics of the variables is presented in Table 1 and the results from the
estimation of Equation 1 are presented in Table 2. All specifications include time and
carrier-route fixed effects. The figures in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors,
clustered by airline. The positive coefficient on Ffp in Column 1, that has log Meanfare as
the dependent variable, indicates that average fares are higher when the fraction of frequent
flyer travelers is larger—positive FFP premium. In particular, this highly statatistically
significant effect indicates that a one percent increase in the proportion of travelers who
use FFP increases average fares by 1.16%. To assess the effect of the programs on the tails
of the pricing distribution, Columns 2 and 3 present the estimates when the logs of the
20th and the 80th percentiles of fares are used as dependent variables. The results show
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that a one percent increase in the proportion of travelers who use FFP increases the 80th
percentile of fares by 1.03%, but increases the 20th percentile by 3.06%. This is evidence
that the programs have a larger effect on the lower tail of the price distribution.
To provide additional insights on the effect of the programs on the distribution of
fares, Figure 1 provides the estimates of δ in the estimation of Equation 1 with the log of
percentiles 5 through 95 of fares (with increments of 5) as the dependent variable. The
shaded area is the 95% confidence interval, * denotes significance at 1% and the numbers
in parentheses are clustered robust standard errors. While the effect is fairly constant for
the 30th percentile and more expensive fares, the effect on the lower tail of fares is larger.
We now turn to the analysis of the role of airport dominance on the effect of the
programs on fares. The positive and highly significant coefficient on the interaction term
in Column 4 indicates that the effect of the programs on average fares is larger when the
carrier has a larger proportion of departing flights from the originating airport. Columns
5 and 6 show that the effect is larger for the lower tail of fares and that airport dominance
plays no role in the effect of the programs on more expensive fares. Figure 2 takes an
additional step and shows the estimated δˆ1 and δˆ2 from Equation 2 at various log of
percentiles of fares as the dependent variable. While the left-hand-side axis shows the
values of the estimates, the right-hand-side axis show the p-values for the null of δ1 = δ2.
The results indicate that the effect of the programs on the lower tail of fares is larger when
the proportion of departures is larger than its median. There is no statistically significant
difference between δ1 and δ2 for higher end fares.
5 Conclusions
Our measure of frequent flyer programs shows an intuitive positive and highly statistically
significant FFP premium. While the positive premium affects the entire price distribution,
the effect was found to be larger for lower end fares. A one percent increase in the proportion
of travelers who use frequent flyer miles increases average fares by 1.16% and increases the
20th percentile and the 80th percentile of fares by 3.06% and 1.03%, respectively. Airport
dominance showed to play an important role by increasing the FFP premium only on lower
end fares.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES mean sd min max
Ffp 0.024 0.042 0.000 0.699
Meanfare 173.4 57.52 27.37 774.9
20Pctfare 110.5 41.37 1.000 676.0
80Pctfare 225.4 92.45 33.00 1,150
Propdepa 0.136 0.146 0.000 1.000
Propdest 0.411 0.270 0.007 1.000
Propdirect 0.459 0.462 0.000 1.000
Numdest 29.60 31.02 1.000 135.0
Loadfact 0.745 0.101 0.000 1.000
Notes: Number of observations: 236,919.
Table 2: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log of log of log of log of log of log of
VARIABLES Meanfare 20Pctfare 80Pctfare Meanfare 20Pctfare 80Pctfare
Ffp 1.158* 3.057* 1.029* 0.981* 1.541* 0.929*
(0.0959) (0.596) (0.0965) (0.125) (0.436) (0.129)
Ffp × Propdepa 0.874* 7.494* 0.496
(0.243) (1.831) (0.374)
Propdepa 0.132 0.369† 0.137 0.0713 -0.148 0.103
(0.134) (0.132) (0.165) (0.129) (0.0904) (0.159)
Propdest 0.0321 0.110 0.0218 0.0303 0.0948 0.0208
(0.0481) (0.0959) (0.0572) (0.0479) (0.0991) (0.0571)
Propdirect -0.0159 0.0925‡ -0.0460* -0.0158 0.0933‡ -0.0459*
(0.0158) (0.0428) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0438) (0.0147)
Numdest/103 -0.0430 -1.430 0.179 0.0522 -0.613 0.233
(0.437) (1.820) (0.453) (0.403) (1.850) (0.423)
Loadfact -0.131† 0.356* -0.231† -0.134† 0.337* -0.232†
(0.0471) (0.0910) (0.0751) (0.0465) (0.0928) (0.0748)
Within R-squared 0.190 0.051 0.132 0.192 0.060 0.132
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of Meanfare in Columns 1 and 4, the log of 20Pctfare in
Columns 2 and 5 and the log of 80Pctfare in Columns 3 and 6. Number of observations: 236,919. Figures
in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by airline. ‡ significant at 10%; † significant at
5%; * significant at 1%.
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Figure 1: Effects of Fft on the log of fare percentiles. The shaded area is the 95% confidence interval. *
significant at 1%. The numbers in parentheses are cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by airline.
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Figure 2: Effects of Fft on the log of fare percentiles. * significant at 1%. The numbers in parentheses
are cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by airline.
7
References
Bilotkach, V. 2009. Parallel Frequent Flier Program Partnerships: Impact on Frequency.
Working Paper. University of California, Irvine.
Borenstein, S. 1989. Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S.
Airline Industry. Rand Journal of Economics 20, 344-365.
Borenstein, S. and N.L. Rose, 1994. Competition and price dispersion in the U.S. airline
industry. Journal of Political Economy 102, 653-683.
Gerardi, K.S. and A.H. Shapiro, 2009. Does Competition Reduce Price Dispersion? New
Evidence from the Airline Industry. Journal of Political Economy 117, 1-37.
Lederman, M., 2007. Do Enhancements to Loyalty Programs Affect Demand? The Impact
of International Frequent Flyer Partnerships on Domestic Airline Demand. Rand Journal
of Economics 38, 1134-1158.
Lederman, M., 2008. Are Frequent Flyer Programs a Cause of the ‘Hub Premium’. Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy 17, 35-66.
8
